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ALMS TO THE RICH: THE FA<;ADE EASEMENT 
DEDUCTION 
Wendy C. Gerzog* 
This article presents the case for repeal of the fayade easement 
deduction. Proponents of this benefit argue that the deduction encourages 
historic preservation by reimbursing property owners for relinquishing their 
right to alter the fayade of their property in a way inconsistent with that 
conservation goal; however, this article shows that there are many reasons 
to urge its repeal: the revenue loss, the small number of beneficiaries, the 
financial demographics of that group of beneficiaries; the dubious industries 
that are supported by the deduction; and the continual marked overvaluation 
and abuse despite Congressional, court, and administrative review and 
expense. 
After the last major reform effort, the Pension Protection Act of 2006, 
in 2009 only ninety-four taxpayers claimed the fayade easement charitable 
deduction with an average return deduction of $477,225. While there may 
be a desire to retain a tax benefit with purported charitable aims, the long 
history of unbridled abuse even with repeated legislative and administrative 
response should make it clear that amending the fayade easement deduction 
is an unending proposition. In today's world, real estate is often subject to 
regulation that buyers and their neighbors accept in order to retain and 
increase a community's property values. The very wealthiest of 
homeowners who purchase homes in historic districts willingly accept local 
restrictions on their property's use. There is no evidence that fayade 
easements significantly alter the behavior of property owners. It provides 
them with huge tax savings for doing what they would do anyway. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Donations of fa9ade easements to conservation charities are gifts 
primarily employed by a small number of very wealthy taxpayers in order 
to generate huge deductions, with few, if any, benefits to the public and 
without appreciably interfering with the enjoyment of the taxpayers' private 
property interests. I After the last major reform, the Pension Protection Act 
* Professor, University Baltimore School of Law. The author would like to thank 
Profs. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Neil Buchanan, Emily Cauble, Steven Dean, Anthony Infanti, 
Linda Jellum, Lily Kahng, Nan Kaufman, Tracy Kaye, Joel Newman, Shu-Yi Oei, Henry 
Ordower, James Repetti, Diane Ring, Walter Schwidetzky, Linda Sugin, Keeva Terry, and 
all of the participants at the 17th Annual Critical Tax Theory Conference, held at the 
University of Baltimore School of Law, Apr. 4-5, 2014, for their very helpful comments. 
I See Richard Rubin, IRS Cracks Down on Breaks in Land of Rich Americans, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news12013-11-06Iirs-cracks 
-down-on-breaks-in-Iand-of-rich-americans.html (Dean Zerbe, who examined easement 
donations as a Republican aide on the Senate Finance Committee said, "I don't know if I 
could design a tax break that's more targeted toward the millionaire set."); Joe Stephens, 
U.S. Targets Tax Break Tied to Fa~ade Easements, WASH. POST (July 9, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.comllocallus-seeks-to-end-tax-break-for-facade-easement-
donations/2011107/05/gIQAFsH35H_story.html ("Since 2002, the Justice Department 
estimates that inflated easement deductions have totaled $1.2 billion. 'These are very 
wealthy people taking a massive deduction on their taxes, for plenty of nothing,' said Dean 
Zerbe, who investigated abusive tax shelters while legal counsel for the Senate Finance 
Committee."). 
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of 2006 (PPA)2 in 2009, for example, only ninety-four taxpayers claimed 
the fayade easement charitable deduction with an average return deduction 
of $477,225.3 
The stated public benefit of a fayade easement is to preserve 
historically significant structures 4 and to give the public a chance to see the 
exterior of these historic treasures. The rationale for the deduction was to 
encourage historic preservation by recompensing the property owner for 
giving up his right to alter the fayade of his property in a way inconsistent 
with that goal. 5 
It is not clear, however, that taxpayers need that tax benefit, 
particularly in light of its exorbitant revenue cost. Taxpayers who purchase 
homes in historic districts know that they will be subject to state and local 
building restrictions. Allowing a federal income tax deduction where a 
taxpayer would not have behaved differently if she did not receive a tax 
benefit results in a waste of revenue.6 
Today, homeowners routinely relinquish rights to do what they want 
with their property in order to protect private property values.7 When a 
2 Pub. L. No. 109-280, §§ 1001, 1213, 120 Stat. 780,1075-76 (2006). 
3 See Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2009, 31 
STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 62, 63 (2012) [hereinafter 2009 Noncash Donations]. 
4 I.R.C. § 170(h)( 4)(A)(iv). 
5 See To Review the Tax Deduction for Far;ade Easements: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong., 4 (2005) 
(testimony of Jim Ramstad, Chairman) [hereinafter 2005 Far,:ade Easement Hearings]. 
6 See STAFF OF JOINT. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX 
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 277-284 (Comm. Print 2005) ("Whenever 
possible, tax incentives should be targeted to those persons who are most lIkely to modify 
their behavior in substantial part because of the provision of the tax benefit. Otherwise, 
providing such benefits constitutes a windfall rather than an incentive. The present charitable 
deduction regime for qualified conservation contributions provides a windfall to those 
taxpayers who grant an easement or other restriction to a qualified organization if the activity 
or use restricted by the easement or restriction likely would never occur. For example, a 
person who purchases a residence in a historic district that has homes that were designed and 
constructed in a particular period and with a particular architectural style generally does not 
acquire the home with the intention of altering the exterior of the building in a manner that 
would be inconsistent with the neighboring structures. Similarly, a person who acquires real 
property located by a nature preserve often is attracted to the area because of the preserve, 
and in such cases would not alter or use the acquired property for a purpose that would 
impede or contravene such preservation efforts.") [heremafter 2005 JOINT COMM. FA<;:ADE 
EASEMENT PROPOSAL]. 
7 The Community Associations Institute, a trade association, estimated that HOAs 
governed 25.9 million American homes and 63.4 million residents in 2012. See Industry 
Data, National Statistics, CMTY. ASS'N INST. (2013), http://www.caionline.org/info/ 
research/pages/default.aspx; FOUND. FOR CMTY. ASS'N RESEARCH, STATISTICAL REVIEW 
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homeowner buys a home in an area that has a community association, the 
buyer purchases her house and must agree to abide by the homeowners 
association's rules, which generally restrict alterations to the exterior of the 
building and to landscaping. In the historic easement and the homeowners' 
association restriction scenarios, the limitations on "unsuitable" alterations 
to the property owner's and his neighbors' fac;ades add value to the owner's 
property. Those constraints are one of the major reasons that the restrictive 
uses are so popular; despite individual owners' grumblings about having 
given up some of their property rights, in the long run the owners subject to 
community association rules benefit from conservation of house value and 
increased market potential when they are ready to sell. 
Aside from generating huge deductions for the rich,8 fac;ade easements, 
ironically, only provide a tax benefit when donors are assured that their 
easement grant will not depreciate the value of their property. 
Representatives from conservation charities have commonly explained and 
reassured potential fac;ade easement donors that they will enjoy large tax 
benefits from their donations "with little to no practical effect on the use, 
value, or marketability of the [easement burdened] property.,,9 Indeed, 
much urban renewal is tied to restoring historical homes. 10 
Fundamentally, charitable deductions are rooted in the policy that 
donations to qualified organizations support the public good. I I The major 
2012, 5 (2012), available at http://www.catrf.orglfoundationstatsbrochure.pdf. 
8 See sources cited supra note I. 
9 1982 East, LLC v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380 (2011), available at 
http://www . ustaxcourt.gov /InOpHistoric/ 1982EastL LC. TCM. WPD. pdf. 
10 See Scheidelman v. Commissioner (Scheidelman Ill), 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117 (T.C. 
2013), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/ScheidelmanMemo. TCM. WPD. 
pdf, ajJ'd, 755 F.3d 148 (2d CiT. 2014) (per curiam) (holding that the Tax Court applied the 
correct legal standard and its determination that the easement had no value was well 
supported by the facts). 
II See, e.g." William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 309-15 (1972) ("In the case of many charitable contributions the material 
goods or services purchased with the contributed funds inure entirely to the benefit of 
persons other than the donor, and the donor enjoys only the nonmaterial satisfaction of 
making a gift .... A good argument can be made that taxable personal consumption should 
be defined to include divisible, private goods and services whose consumption by one 
household precludes enjoyment by others, but not collective goods whose enjoyment is 
nonpreclusive or the nonmaterial satisfactions that arise from making contributions."). See 
generally, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Reforming the Charitable Contribution Substantiation Rules, 
14 FLA. TAX REV. 275, 279 (2013); Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable 
Deductions, 84 IND. LJ. 1047 (2009); Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case of the Taxpaying Good 
Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity under Federal Income Tax Law, 
Theory, and Policy, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1243 (2002); Roger Colvinaux, Rationale and 
Changing the Charitable Deduction, 138 TAX NOTES 1453, 1455 (Mar. 25, 2013) ("Yet 
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charitable split interest 1969 refonns 12 were focused on ensuring that the 
amounts that taxpayers deducted matched the amounts that the charities 
received. Besides the matching goal of the 1969 provisions,13 in order to 
detennine whether the overall effect of a transfer produces a positive net 
contribution to the public good, I propose inserting an additional factor into 
that calculus - the amount of loss in the federal fisc due to the high 
enforcement expenditures caused by almost unifonnly overvalued fa9ade 
another reason for the [charitable] deduction IS that it uniquely allows taxpayers to allocate 
what would otherwise be public funds."); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, 
Gafls, and Gefls ": The Income Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable 
"Gifts" and a Principled Policy Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts From Income, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441 (2003); David Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 531, 545-66 (2006). Some scholars have criticized the charitable deduction 
and have argued for the use of direct government subsidies instead. See, e.g., Paul R. 
McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable ContributIOns: A Substitute for the 
Income Tax Deduction, 27 TAX L. REV. 377-78 (1972) (In order to eliminate tax inequity and 
the bias in favor of the wealthy, " ... we should substitute for the charitable deduction a 
system of direct federal assistance for private charitable organizations through a matching 
grant mechanism. "). 
12 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201,83 Stat. 526-62 (1969). In 
1969, Congress significantly reformed the charitable deduction and enacted split interest 
rules to combat valuation abuses where the taxpayer's deduction exceeded the amount the 
chanty received. See S. REP. No. 91-522, at 86-88 (1969) ("The rules of present law for 
determining the amount of a charitable contribution deduction in the case of gifts of 
remainder interests in trust do not necessarily have any relation to the value of the benefit 
which the charity receives. This is because the trust assets may be invested in a manner so as 
to maximize the income interest with the result that there is little relation between the 
interest assumptions used in calculating present values and the amount received by the 
charity. "). 
13 With regard to conservatIOn easements, some scholars have questioned whether 
even that goal is satisfied. See Daniel Halperin, A Better Way to Encourage Gifts of 
Conservation Easements, 136 TAX NOTES 307, 310 (July 16, 2012) ("Because of the 
uniqueness of each encumbered property, the variability in easement restrictions, and paucity 
of easement sales, comparable sales (purchases of similar easements on closely similar 
properties) would be rare. Therefore, focus is on the supposed decline in the property value 
for the donor resulting from the imposition of the restriction .... Not only is the decline in 
value difficult to measure, but the approach itself is faulty. Importantly, we have no evidence 
that the public benefit is equal to the estimated decline in selling price." (citation 
omitted)). This article presents a "shelf project" proposal, one that is part of a larger 
inventory of tax reform proposals. See Calvin Johnson, The Shelf Project: Revenue Raising 
Proposals to Defend the Tax Base, http://www.utexas.edullaw/faculty/calvinjohnson/ 
shelf.JlrojecUnventory_subject_matter.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014); see also Roger 
Cohnvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 263 (2013); Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tar Expenditure: In 
Search of Conservation Value, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 6 (2012) [hereinafter Colinvaux, 
Conservation Value]. 
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easement donations. 14 Because of the inherent and persistent abuses of 
overvaluation15 and of the mounting costs of constant government 
14 See David van den Berg, IRS Scrutinizing Conservation Easements, 137 TAX NOTES 
19 (Oct. I, 2012); IRS News Release, IR-20I4-3I, IRS Bars Appraisers from Valuing 
Facade Easements for Federal Tax Purposes for Five Years (Mar. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 
2014 IRS News Release], available at http://www.irs.gov/uaclNewsroomIIRS-Bars-
Appraisers-from-Valuing-Facade-Easements-for-Federal-Tax-Purposes-for-Five-Y ears); IRS 
Notice 2004-41, 2004-1 e.B. 31 (Jun. 30, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 IRS Notice] (informing 
taxpayers of increased scrutiny of fayade easement deductions); Richard Rubin, IRS Cracks 
Down on Breaks in Land of Rich Americans, BLOOMBERG NEWS, (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20 I 3- I I -06/irs-cracks-down-on-breaks-in-Iand-of-rich-
americans.html ("In this case and dozens like it, the IRS is challenging a complex and 
obscure tax break that benefits some of the nation's wealthiest property owners."). In RERI 
Holdings I v. CommiSSIOner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488, slip op. at 9 (T.e. 2014), available at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/ReriHoldingsMemo.Halpern.TCM.WPD.pdf, the 
Tax Court described an economic sham. In certain respects, over-valued fayade easement 
deductions that do not change taxpayer behavior are "economic shams." ("Generally 
speaking, the term 'economic sham' (as opposed to the term 'factual sham', i.e., a 
transaction that did not occur) describes a transaction that actually occurred but that exploits 
a feature of the Internal Revenue Code without any attendant economic risk." Id.) Because 
the taxpayer's property enjoyment is barely impinged and is coupled with a very large tax 
benefit, fayade easement donations also commonly evidence a lack of the donative intent, as 
required by United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986) ("The sine 
qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate 
consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely 
contributed money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he received in return."). 
In American Bar Endowment, the Court rejected a charitable deduction allowance for the so-
called donation to the organization when bar members purchased insurance because the 
insurance premiums were consistent with market value costs and the members' purchase of 
insurance was intended to and did serve their own private interests; by their "donations," the 
bar members did not indicate a desire to benefit the bar association's charitable works. When 
a deduction creates a consequence (increased property value) that destroys the rationale for 
that deduction (to compensate the land owner for his loss in value), and does not appreciably 
add to the public good, it tamts "the motivations of those who would have otherwise donated 
exclusively out of a sense of altruism." Id.; see Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Maller: 
Reframing the Crowding Out EjJect of Legal Incentives, 123 YALE LJ. 1070, 1098 (2014) 
("Those habituated into thinking of charitable donations as a means for personal gain may 
fail to cultivate ideal levels of generosity and good will or, alternatively, cheapen their mode 
of relating to their beneficiaries."). However, the fact that many taxpayers are motivated to 
make charitable deductions at least in part to enjoy the tax benefit of the deduction is not at 
issue. "If the motivation to receive a tax benefit deprived a gift of its charitable nature under 
section 170, virtually no charitable gifts would be deductible." RERI Holdings 1,107 T.e.M. 
(CCH) slip op. at 13 (citing Scheidelman v. Commissioner (Scheidelman II), 682 F. 3d 189, 
200 (2d Cir. 2012), remanded to 105 T.C.M.(CCH) 1117 (T.C. 2013), ajJ'd, 755 F.3d 148 
(2d Clr. 2014)). 
15 See Roger Colinvaux, Conservation Easements: DeSign Flaws, Enforcement 
Challenges, and Reform, 3 UTAH L. REV. 755, 765-66 (2013) [hereinafter Colinvaux, 
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oversight,16 the fa~ade easement deduction has become counterproductive. 
When the broader calculus approach I have suggested is applied, it is clear 
that fa~ade easement donations serve private purposes and expend public 
funds to a greater degree than they foster the public good. Fa~ade easements 
typically allow property owners to maintain or raise property values just as 
homeowners' association rules do in many communities nationwide. 
Historically accurate fa~ades typically maintain or increase the value of 
those buildings because the property becomes more desirable real estate. 
Also, fa~ade easements generally do not reduce valuation because local law 
restrictions already impose adequate limitations to preserve the historic 
fa~ades of the buildings 17 and, because the restrictions only apply to the 
fa~ade of the building, the use limitations on the total square footage of the 
building are slight. 18 
Finally, repeal is not only warranted but overdue. In 2005, the Joint 
Committee on Taxation recommended fa<;ade easement repeal at least on 
property where the owner or his family had a personal residence. 19 Even 
with additional strictures enacted in the PP A, which does not include the 
Joint Committee's proposal, fa<;ade easements remain rampant with abuse. 
Many scholars have criticized the abuse, which they would like to eliminate 
or at least minimize, 20 but only one, Professor Daniel Halperin,21 has called 
Easement Reform] ("Unfortunately, the lost economic development value bears no relation 
to the conservation value of the easement, meaning that the appraised fair market value does 
not provide a proxy for the public benefit of the contribution." (citations omitted)); Halperin, 
supra note 13, at 308-11. 
16 See Colinvaux, Easement Reform, supra note 15, at 771 ("The result is that 
valuation uncertainties can be used to benefit donors, often for questionable conservation 
benefits, and the IRS does not have the enforcement tools it needs, leaving it to fight 
valuation battles that ultimately provide little to no sense of the public benefit provided."); 
Halperin, supra note 13, at 308-11. 
17 See infra Part lILA. 
18 See Scheidelman v. Commissioner (Scheidelman lIf), 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1117, slip 
op. at 19 (T.C. 2013), available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/Scheidelman 
Memo.TCM.WPD.pdf (the government's expert "concluded that because only the facade 
was affected by the easement and the loss of utility was only to the facade, the restrictIOns 
would not have a material effect on the market value of the whole property."), ajJ'd, 755 
F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Even with the Pension Protection Act (PPA), which 
requires restrictions to apply to all exterior sides of the structure, there is no limitation 
applicable to the inside of the building. See infra Part IV. 
19 2005 JOINT COMM. FA<;:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 282-87; see 2005 
FGI;:ade Easement Hearings, supra note 5 (including in the record, without objection, the 
opening Statement of the Honorable John Lewis despite Lewis' absence from the hearing). 
20 See, e.g., Colinvaux, Easement Reform, supra note 15, at 767-71 (suggesting the 
need for comprehensive reform); Colinvaux, Conservation Value, supra note 13 (arguing to 
retain a tax benefit, but proposing either one geared to the value of the pre-easement property 
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for the repeal of fayade easements. While there may be a desire to retain a 
tax benefit with purported charitable aims, the long history of unbridled 
abuse even with repeated legislative and administrative response should 
make it clear that amending the fayade easement deduction is an unending 
proposition. The costs, the few very wealthy direct beneficiaries of this 
subsidy, and the questionable industries that are indirectly supported by this 
deduction22 should tell even the most sanguine that repeal is the only 
reasonable action for Congress to take at this time. 
I. So FEW, CLAIMING So MUCH 
While the number of taxpayers seeking a fayade deduction is relatively 
small, the deductions claimed are large and the taxpayers claiming the 
deductions are most often very wealthy. In 2009, of all individual noncash 
charitable donations, conservation easements ($483,522) and fayade 
easements ($477,225) constituted "the highest average deduction per 
or to a variable tax credit that would match the conservation benefit of the easement); Nancy 
A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What Have We 
Learned and Where Should We Go from Here? 3 UTAH L. REV. 688, 722 (2013) (desiring 
comprehensive statutory and regulatory reforms, possibly modeled on the reforms made in 
some New England states and California, but observing that the current state of the 
conservation easement looks like "a grand and hopeful experiment, but one that ultimately 
could prove to be unsuccessful."); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending Tax-
Deductible Conservation Easements: Protecting the Federal investment After Carpenter, 
Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 217 (2012) (seeking clear Service or statutory 
guidance harmonious with the legislative purpose behind conservation easements). 
21 See Halperin, supra note 13, at 311-13 (proposing more broadly that all 
conservation easement deductions, as well as the estate tax exclusion of section 2031 (c), be 
repealed and replaced by a targeted spending program); Daniel Halperin, incentives for 
Conservation Easements: The Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 29, 45-47 (2011). However, one non-tax scholar whose principal message on 
conservation easements is to eliminate the perpetuity reqUirement, stated: "Beyond the 
questions of proper valuation and justifiable conservation values attained, allowing a tax 
deduction for conservatIOn easements may not be the best use of public funds. Even with 
adequately conserved land, providing a public benefit, and properly assessed according to 
the IRS's calculation instructions, conservation easements may not be the best choice for 
land preservation. Depending on the loss of tax revenues, it may be more economically 
efficient to collect the taxes and use the money to purchase land in fee. (citation omitted)." 
Jessica Owley, Changmg Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual 
Conservation Easements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 121, ISO-51 (2011). 
22 Fa9ade easements support charities that monitor their compliance. Those charities 
often require the easement donors to make cash donations equal to a certain percentage 
(generally ten percent) of the value of their easements for that work. This practice in tum 
often encourages the charity's acquiescence to an easement donation's overvaluation. See 
infra notes 37,125, and text discussion in Kaufman 111 in Part 1II.e. 
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return." Both were close to one-half million dollars per return. 23 For 
comparison, the average donation of stock per return was $86,186 in that 
24 same year. 
TABLE 1. INDIVIDUAL CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF F A<;:ADE 
EASEMENTS FROM 2005 TO 200925 
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF AVERAGE 
RETURNS DONATIONS AMOUNT PER 
RETURN 
2005 1,028 1,132 299,080 
2006 1,143 1,145 231,572 
2007 228 242 974,779 
2008 1,180 1,396 32,462 
2009 94 103 477,225 
TABLE 2. INDIVIDUAL CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CORPORATE 
STOCK FROM 2005 TO 200926 
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF AVERAGE 
RETURNS DONATIONS AMOUNT PER 
RETURN 
2005 181,192 339,828 90,162 
2006 187,325 429,139 122,745 
2007 202,019 450,824 117,458 
2008 123,510 268,344 99,912 
2009 112,852 231,171 86,186 
At least some of the differences in both fayade easement and corporate 
stock donations in 2007 and 2008 could be attributed to the economic 
d . . 2008 27 f'C' I . 28 k' 29 ownturn occurnng m ,a lectmg rea estate pnces, stoc pnces, 
23 2009 Noncash Donations, supra note 3. 
24 Id. 
25 The data are derived from Form 8283. See Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash 
Contributions, 2005, 27 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 68, 69 (2008). Pearson Liddell & Janette 
Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2006, 29 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 67, 68 (2009 
Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2007, 29 STAT. OF 
INCOME BULL. 52, 53 (2010) [hereinafter 2007 Noncash Donations Pearson Liddell & 
Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2008, 30 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 76, 77 
(201 I); 2009 Noncash Donations, supra note 3. 
26 See sources cited supra note 25. 
27 For the fact and contributing causes of the 2008 financial crisis, see, for example, 
Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2011/0I/26/business/economy/26inquiry.html? _r=0; Steve 
Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com!sites/stevedenning/2011l11/22/5086/; Larry Elliott, Global Financial 
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and charitable giving generally.3o However, the results for fas;ade easements 
appear to be anomalies, but it is impossible to determine the causes 
because, with so few donors, further inquiries run into prohibited identity 
disclosures of individual taxpayers.3] Ignoring those years as outliers, the 
number of fas;ade easement donors IS small and the claimed donation IS 
large. 
Although one of the only two types of noncash charitable gifts that 
increased in 2009, from $0.38 billion in 2008 to $0.45 billion in 2009, the 
number of taxpayers claiming deductions for fas;ade easement contributions 
decreased. In 2009, there were only ninety-four returns claiming the fas;ade 
easement deduction, as compared to 112,852 returns claiming deductions 
32 for corporate stock. 
To underline how few taxpayers benefit from the fas;ade easement 
charitable deduction, the 2010 and 2011 Internal Revenue Service (Service) 
statistics for noncash charitable deductions combine all conservation 
easements into one category. According to the senior analyst preparing this 
data, there are insufficient data to segregate the statistics for each 
subcategory, such as fas;ade easements, and therefore to disclose that 
specific information "would constitute an unlawful disclosure of individual 
taxpayer data and therefore could not be provided.,,33 In 2010, there were 
2,933 returns claiming charitable contributions of all types of conservation 
easements including fas;ade easement donations;34 in 2011, there were a 
total of 1,813 conservation easement returns?5 Again, their numbers pale in 
Crisis: Five Key Stages 2007-2011, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www. 
theguardian.comlbusiness/20 II/aug/07 /global-financial-crisis-key-stages ("It took a year for 
the financial crisis to come to a head but it did so on 15 September 2008 when the US 
government allowed the investment bank Lehman Brothers to go bankrupt."). 
28 Dean Baker, The Housing Bubble and the FinancIGI Crisis, 46 REAL-WORLD ECON. 
REV. 73, 74-75 (20 II), available at http://paecon.netiPAERevlew/issue46/Baker46.pdf. 
29 Gerald P. Dwyer, Stock Prices in the Financial Crisis, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
ATLANTA (September 2009), http://www.frbatlanta.org/cenfis/pubscf/stock-prices_ 
infinancial_crisis.cfm ("Stock prices fell roughly 50 percent from peak to trough from 
October 2007 to March 2009."). 
30 See SARA K. GOULD, FOUND. CENTER, DIMINISHING DOLLARS: THE IMPACT OF THE 
2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE FIELD OF SOCIAL JUSTICE PHILANTHROPY (2011), available at 
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/researchlpdf/diminishing_ dollars20 I I.pdf. 
31 See infra note 33. 
32 2009 Noncash Donations, supra note 3. 
33 See E-mail from Ruth Schwartz, Statistics of Income Div., Internal Revenue 
Service, to author (June 4,2014) (on file with author). 
34 Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2010, 32 
STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 64 (2013) [hereinafter 2010 Noncash Donations]. 
35 See Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2011, 33 
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relation to the number of returns claiming corporate stock donations for 
those years: 123,109 returns in 201036 and 112,094 returns in 2011.37 
Because the value of a fayade easement represents a small fraction of 
the value of the encumbered property before the creation of the easement, 
the underlying property values are likely to be many times the value of the 
deduction-that means that by retaining the fayade easement deduction, 
Congress is benefiting a small number of multi-millionaires.38 That is, by 
means of the fayade easement deduction, Congress is giving alms to very 
wealthy property owners and is not meaningfully providing for the public 
good. 
II. THE FA<;ADE EASEMENT CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
The income tax conservation easement deduction is provided for by 
section 170(h) and is further explained in Treasury Regulation section 
1. 170A-14.39 For the donated land interest to qualify as serving exclusively 
STAT. OF INCOME BULL. I II (2014) [hereinafter 2011 Noncash Donations]. 
36 2010 Noncash Donations, supra note 34. 
37 2011 Noncash Donations, supra note 35. 
38 Because most hIstoric structures are subject to local restrictions, the easement's 
actual value is likely to be minimal or zero; however, as case law indicates many of the 
easements were not properly valued but were valued by mUltiplying the value of the property 
without the easement by a fixed percentage of between II and 12.5 percent. See infra note 
131; see also Rothman v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1864 (T.C. 2012), vacated in 
part, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 126 (T.C. 2012) (holding on reconsideration that the taxpayer's 
appraisal "still fails to satisfy 8 of 15 requirements" for a qualified appraisal). Thus, if the 
average fa.;ade deduction is $300,000, by that improper valuation method but often used 
percentage, the value of the historic home is somewhere between $2.4M and $2,727,273 
(i.e., $300,000 divided respectively by .125 and by .11). 
39 I.R.C. § 2031(c)(8)(B) provides an estate tax exclusion for qualified conservation 
easements, but that exclusion of estate tax value is not available to fa.;ade easements. This 
estate tax provision identifies those easements with reference to the definition of "a qualified 
conservation contribution (as defined in section 170(h)(1) ofa qualified real property interest 
(as defined in section 170(h)(2)(C)), except that clause (iv) of section 170(h)(4)(A) shall not 
apply, and the restriction on the use of such interest described in section l70(h)(2)(C) shall 
include a prohibition on more than a de minimis use for a commercial recreational activity." 
(emphasis added)). The I.R.C. § 2031(c) conservation easement exclusion was enacted as 
part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34, § 508(a). If the executor so elects, the 
estate may exclude the lesser of a maximum of forty percent of the value of the land subject 
to the qualified conservation easement, reduced by any amount of estate tax charitable 
deduction claimed under I.R.C. § 2055(f) for the same land, or $500,000 from the value of 
decedent's gross estate. That provIsion was amended by the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of2001, P.L. 107-16, § 551(a), amending I.R.C. §§ 2031 (c)(2) and 
(c )(8), removing most of the geographical limitations of the statute. Before the 200 I act, the 
exclusion was restricted to land located close to a metropolitan area, national park, 
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conservation purposes, it must satisfy the requirements of both subsections 
l70(h)(4) and l70(h)(5).4o Gift and estate tax deductions are allowable 
wilderness area, or urban national forest; with the 2001 amendment, the exclusion is 
available to conservation easements attached to any land within the United States or a u.S. 
possession. 
40 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) provides: 
(A)ln general. - For purposes of this subsection, the term "conservation 
purpose" means - (i) the preservation ofland areas for outdoor recreation by, or 
the education of, the general public, (ii) the protection of a relatively natural 
habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem, (iii) the preservation of 
open space (Including farmland and forest land) where such preservation is - (I) 
for the scenic enjoyment of the general public, or (II) pursuant to a clearly 
delineated Federal, State, or local governmental conservation policy, and will 
yield a significant public benefit, or (iv) the preservation of an historically 
important land area or a certified historic structure. 
(C)Certified historic structure - For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iv), the term 
"certified historic structure" means any building, structure, or land area which 
(i) is listed in the National Register, or 
(ii) is located in a registered historic district (as defined in section 47(c)(3)(8)) 
and is certified by the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary as being of 
historic significance to the district. 
A building, structure, or land area satisfies the preceding sentence if it satisfies 
such sentence either at the time of the transfer or on the due date (including 
extensions) for filing the transferor's return under this chapter for the taxable year 
in which the transfer is made. 
I.R.C. § 170(h)(5) provides: 
Exclusively for conservation purposes - For purposes of this subsection-
Conservation purpose must be protected - A contnbution shall not be treated as 
exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is 
protected in perpetuity. 
No surface mining permitted -
In general - Except as provided in clause (ii), in the case of a contribution of any 
interest where there IS a retention of a qualified mineral interest, subparagraph 
(A) shaH not be treated as met if at any time there may be extraction or removal 
of minerals by any surface mining method. 
Special rule - With respect to any contribution of property in which the 
ownership of the surface estate and mineral interests has been and remains 
separated, subparagraph (A) shaH be treated as met if the probability of surface 
mining occurring on such property is so remote as to be negligible. 
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under sections 2S22(d) and 20SS(f), respectively.41 
Congress enacted and has maintained the deduction to reimburse 
owners of historic buildings for the additional cost incurred in maintaining 
and insuring the buildings and to recompense the owners for the loss in 
property value due to their restricted use.42 Nowadays, many communities 
have homeowners' associations that restrict an owner's property usage in 
order to maintain or increase property values in that community.43 Congress 
likewise enacted a rehabilitation credit to renovate these structures.44 
All of the conservation easement Internal Revenue Code (Code) 
provisions provide exceptions to the general rule that donations that contain 
both charitable and noncharitable interests are nondeductible.45 Indeed, 
because of the opportunities for abusive shifting of benefits to the 
noncharitable beneficiary, Congress, the courts, and scholars have 
continually acknowledged the potential for and existence of abuse with 
41 I.R.C. § 2522(d) provides: "A deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) in 
respect of any transfer of a qualified real property interest (as defined in section 
170(h)(2)(C)) which meets the requirements of section 170(h) (without regard to paragraph 
(4)(A) thereol)." I.R.C. § 2055(1) provides for an identical description of the deduction for 
estate tax purposes. 
42 See, e.g., Federal Hlstonc Preservation Tax Incentives Program (1976). However, 
the initial legislation lacked clarity in its requirements. See Glass v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 
258, 279 n.16 (2005) ("Congress did not in the TRA 1976 define (or indicate the meaning 
01) either the word 'exclusively' or the term 'exclusively for conservation purposes.' Nor 
does the legislative history of the TRA 1976 shed any light on the meaning of that word or 
that term."). Likewise, the statute is not particularly helpful in explaining the "exclusively 
for conservation purposes" requirement. "The statute contains no further specific guidance as 
to when a contribution of a qualified real property interest that IS protected in perpetuity will 
be exclusively for conservation purposes." ld. at 277. However, the court in Glass did find 
some assistance III subsequent tax legislation. According to the conference report for the Tax 
Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977: "it is intended that a contributIOn of a 
conservation easement * * * qualify for a deductIOn only if the holding of the easement * * * 
is related to the purpose or function constituting the donee's purpose for exemption * * * and 
the donee is able to enforce its rights as holder of the easement***and protect the 
conservation purposes which the contribution is intended to advance. The requirement that 
the contribution be exclusively for conservation purposes is also intended to limit deductible 
contributions to those transfers which require that the donee hold the easement * * * 
exclusively for conservation purposes (i.e., that they not be transferable by the donee in 
exchange for money, other property, or services)." H.R. REP. 95-263, at 30-31 (1977) (Conf. 
Rep.), cited in Glass at 279. 
43 Today, many homes are purchased in developments with community homeowners 
rules. See supra note 7. Moreover, zoning has traditionally restricted area usage. See Bradley 
C. Karkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 45 (1994). 
44 See I.R.C. § 47. 
45 For the prohibition against split interest gifts, see I.R.C. § 170(1)(3), specifically 
I.R.C. § 170(1)(3)(B)(iii) for the exception of conservation easements to this rule. 
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d 1·· Ii 46 regar to sp It mterest trans ers. 
III. THE ABUSES: REVIEW OF RECENT CASE LAW 
A. Overvaluation and Questionable Devaluation 
With favade easements, overvaluation and inaccurate appraisals are 
endemic. The Service issued Notice 2004-41 47 to notify both donors and 
charities that the government was going to scrutinize conservation 
easements and not only deny deductions, but also, where warranted, to 
impose penalties and excise taxes and revoke a charity's tax exempt status. 
According to the Service, however, abuses relating to favade easements 
. 48 persIst. 
Scholars and the courts have appreciated the difficulty in valuing split 
interest property donations that provide a benefit not only to the charity but 
also to the donor. With conservation easements that require the donee to 
monitor and enforce the easement in perpetuity, the quid pro quo value of 
the donation is even more difficult to calculate.49 Favade easement charities 
typically require a cash donation equal to a percentage of the value of the 
donated easement. That practice, according to some courts, contributes to 
46 See, e.g., Turner v. Commissioner, 126 T.e. 299, 317 (2006) (citing S. REP. No. 96-
1007, at 9-10 (1980) ("[T]he committee believes that provisions allowing deductions for 
conservatIOn easements should be directed at the preservation of unique or otherwise 
sIgnificant land areas or structures * * * the committee bill would restrict the qualifying 
contributions where there is no assurance that the public benefit, if any, furthered by the 
contribution would be substantial enough to justify the allowance of a deduction. * * *")). 
47 2004 IRS Notice, supra note 14 ("This notice informs taxpayers that the Service 
will, in appropriate cases, reduce or disallow deductions claimed by taxpayers under section 
170 of the Code for transfers in connection with conservation easements. This notice also 
informs participants in these transactIOns that they may be subject to other adverse tax 
consequences, including penalties, excise taxes, and loss of tax-exempt status, as 
appropriate."). 
48 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Conservation Easements, IRS.GOV (Apr. 17, 
2014), http://www .irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Conservation-Easements ("Another 
problem arises in connection with historic easements, particularly fac,:ade easements. Here 
again, some taxpayers are taking improperly large deductions. They agree not to modIfy the 
fac,:ade of their historic house and they give an easement to this effect to a charity. However, 
if the fac,:ade was already subject to restrictions under local zoning ordinances, the taxpayers 
may, in fact, be giving up nothing, or very little. A taxpayer cannot give up a right that he or 
she does not have."); 2014 IRS News Release, supra note 14. 
49 Halperin, supra note 13, at 311 ("Donors maybe giving up very little, particularly 
because the burden on a donor depends on the holder's monitoring and enforcing the use 
restrictions over the long term. Also, an easement's benefit to the public may be much less 
than the purported loss to the donor. The professional staffs of the JCT and the Senate 
Finance Committee expressed similar reservations in 2005." (citations omitted)). 
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the easement itself being overvalued: the charity that gains more from a 
higher valuation is not likely to question even a conspicuously large 
easement value. 50 
In Friedberg, 51 a 2013 fa«;:ade easement case involving tax year 2003 
and a claimed deduction of $3,775,000,52 the taxpayer's appraiser listed 
among "downward" factors of a fayade easement full development loss, 
possibly more maintenance costs, no choice or change in the building 
exterior, and the fact that future owners would not be able to benefit tax-
wise from adding a fa«;:ade easement to the property. 53 
In Gorra,54 a 2013 case involving a fa~ade charitable deduction in tax 
years 2006 and 2007,55 even where the court agreed that the taxpayers' 
easement was more restrictive than local law and served a valid 
conservation purpose in perpetuity, the court reduced the taxpayers' 
claimed easement value of $605,000 to $104.000, which represents 
approximately an eighty-three percent reduction in valuation. As such, the 
easement created only a two percent diminution of the building'S value.56 
50 See supra note 22; infra Part III.e. Kaufman III and accompanying notes. 
51 Friedberg v. Commissioner (Friedberg II), 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 360 (T.C. 2013), 
supplementing Friedberg 1, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 356 (T.C. 2011) (granting the government 
summary judgment on the basis that the taxpayers' appraisal, which applied a percentage 
diminution rather than the required "before and after" valuation method and which 
considered property outside of New York City, was not a qualified one). The court granted 
the taxpayers summary judgment on their motion for reconsideration in light of Scheidel man 
v. Commissioner (Scheidelman II), 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012). The second circuit in 
Scheidelman Il held that the regulation dealing with an appraisal's identification of his 
valuation method only reqUIres that he report that method, and not that there be an adequate 
basis for or reasonable use of that method. Scheidelman II at 196-97. The Friedberg 11 court 
held that the taxpayers' expert's appraisal was a qualified one prepared by a qualified 
appraiser under Scheidelman Il because it "includes a specific basis for [the appraiser's] 
valuation .... However, we specifically do not opine on the reliability and accuracy of the 
methodology and specific basis of valuatIOn in the [taxpayer's appraiser's] appraisal, a 
matter we leave to be decided at trial." Friedberg 11, slip op. at 8. 
52 Friedberg Il, slip op. at 5. The taxpayers made a required $350,000 cash 
contribution to monitor the property. Id. slip op. at I. 
53 Id. slip op. at 4. 
54 Gorra v. CommiSSIOner, 106 T.C.M. (CHH) 523 (2013). 
55 ld. (The 2007 deduction related to the 2006 fa~ade easement contribution, which, 
because of the percentage limitations in I.R.C. § 170(b) on current year deductibility, had to 
be carried over as a deduction into the followmg year). 
56 The taxpayer also made a $45,000 cash contribution to cover mOnItoring costs as 
required by the charity. !d. slip op. at 2. In 2009, the charity allowed the taxpayers to add a 
retractable awning to the building'S fayade because it "determined that the awning was 
consistent with the historical character of the property." ld. slip op. at 6. 
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The court thereby imposed a gross valuation penalty57 under such 
circumstances, resulting in a forty percent penalty on the portion of the 
underpayment attributable to the gross valuation misstatement. 
Most of the homes involved are already subject to local building 
restrictions. Thus, taxpayers who purchased their homes in a historic district 
bought them with concomitant expectations of maintaining historic fayade 
easements. Moreover, those restrictions were imposed to maintain and 
improve property values. In Scheidelman, the court held that the taxpayers' 
easement had zero value because the easement echoed local restrictions. 
Likewise, in 1982 East, the court did not find that the easement provided 
any "additional meaningful protection not already guaranteed by the LPCs 
enforcement of local law.,,58 Indeed, in that case, the bank mortgagee 
checked to ascertain that the collateral value of the building would not be 
affected by the imposition of the easement and "concluded that it would 
not.,,59 The taxpayers' experts in Dunlap60 did not explain how the 
charitable easement was more restrictive than the regulations imposed by 
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission. 
Similarly, recently in Chandler,61 the South End Landmark District 
Commission (SELDC) already regulated the two properties subject to 
fayade easements. "The SELDC's powers closely approximate [the 
charity's] powers under the easement agreements with some exceptions.,,62 
The court held that the taxpayers' expert's appraisal was totally unreliable. 
57 I.R.C. § 6661(h). 
58 1982 East, LLC v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380, slip op. at 10 (2011), 
available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/inOpHistoricI1982EastLLC.TCM.WPD.pdf ("Thus 
it is local law and the rules of the LPC that preserve the subject property and not the rights 
which [the charity] possessed under the deed of easement."). 
59 Id. slip op. at 4. 
60 Dunlap v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CHH) 1689 (T.C. 2012) (This case is a 
consolidated case with taxpayers who owned units in the Cobblestone Loft Condominium 
(Cobblestone), which is located in a historic district in New York City, and who granted 
far;ade easements to the same charity); see Wendy C. Gerzog, Fat;ade Easement: Inexpert 
ValuatIOn, 136 Tax Notes 199 (July 9, 2012). in Seventeen Seventy Sherman Street LLC v. 
Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599 (T.C. 2014), although the court did not need to 
decide this issue because it held that the taxpayer had not proved that it had transferred a 
greater value for its interior and exterior easement grants than the property it received in 
return, the taxpayer had claimed a $7,150,000 charitable deduction for property already 
subject to some exterior restrictions by the Denver Landmark Preservation Commission. 
61 Chandler v. Commissioner, 142 T.C.M. (CCH) 16 (2014), aVa/lable at http:// 
www.ustaxcourt.gov/inOpHistoric/ChandlerDiv.Goeke.TC.WPD.pdf. 
62 Id. slip op. at 6. Those exceptions included that the local law restrictions only 
covered construction publicly visible, they relied on public complaints for violatIOn 
notification, and they contained an exemption from enforcement for owners who could show 
that they would thereby encounter significant financial hardship. Id 
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The encumbered property was located in or near Boston, but the appraiser 
used "comparables" from New York City and New Orleans63; the sample 
was too small; the New Orleans valuation was based on a settlement 
amount when the buyer discovered that the property sold was encumbered 
by an easement; only one of the four Boston property appraisals was not 
"seriously flawed"; and the appraiser made subjective adjustments that the 
court dismissed as unhelpfu1.64 Significantly, however, while the appraiser 
determined that one data point property sold for between 12.8% and 18.5% 
less than two other properties because of the differences in their 
encumbrances, the court found that the deed of that property contained 
substantially similar limitations to the other property's easements. 
According to the court, "This indicates that the difference in price resulted 
from some other factor that [the appraiser] did not consider. This error 
undermines [the appraiser's] credibility concermng not only this 
comparison, but the entire report. ,,65 
At the same time, the court rejected the government's appraisal that 
showed an appreciation in value in Boston encumbered propertl6 after the 
easements were granted because it did not specify how much of that 
increase was due to renovations property owners had made. Although the 
taxpayers pointed to distinctions between the easement and local law 
limitations, the court held that, like in Kaufman IV, those differences were 
not likely to be meaningful to a buyer. Rejecting the taxpayers' appraisal 
report in its totality as not credible, the court held that the taxpayers had not 
proved any value for their fayade easement contribution. 
Despite that the properties were already subject to local rules and 
regulations requiring them to maintain the historic features of their house, 
63 The court considered the out of state easements unpersuasive. Jd. slip op. at 12 
("The values of easements In other markets tell us little about easement values in Boston's 
unique market."). 
64 The taxpayers' appraIser made major adjustments based on his own subjective rating 
of the properties' condition. "Because of these significant subjective adjustments, [the 
appraiser's] conclusions flowing from these comparisons largely reflect his opinion rather 
than the objective market values of the easements. When an appraiser makes numerous 
adjustments to a subject property's comparables, the subject property's valuation becomes 
less reliable." Jd. slip op. at 14. The taxpayers' appraiser's report also had procedural 
mistakes. "He calculated the easement values by dividing the difference in sale prices by the 
encumbered property's price. He then applied that percentage to the before value of 
petitioners' properties to calculate the easement values. He should have divided the 
difference in sale prices by the unencumbered property's sale price. We have adjusted the 
data in his report to account for this error." Jd. slip op. at 11 n.3. 
65 Id. slip op. at 15. 
66 Id. slip op. at 15-16 ("Mr. Bowman selected nine recently encumbered Boston 
properties that sold between 2005 and 2011."). 
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the easement values for which the taxpayers had claimed charitable 
deductions were very large: 61 York Acquisition, LLC, $10,730,000 
(partnership level deduction);671982 East, $6,570,000 (partnership level 
deduction);68Carpenter, $385,600;69 Chandler, $191,400 (the Claremont 
70 property easement) and $371,250 (the West Newton easement); Dunlap, 
$237,000;71 Friedberg, $3,775,000;72 Gorra, $605,000;73 Graev, 
$990,000;74 McSweens, $2,210,464;75 Scheidelman, $115,000;76 
Schrimsher, $705,000;77 Simmons, $162,500 (Logan Circle) and $93,000 
(Vermont Avenue),78 and Van Wyhe, $801,121.79 
67 61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-266, 2013 Tax. Ct. 
Memo. LEXIS 274 (T.C. 2013) (Despite its fayade easement deduction claim, the court 
disallowed any deduction on the ground that because the partnership owned only the first 
fourteen levels of a twenty story building, it could not satisfy the statutory requirement that 
its grant of a fayade easement restrict the entire exterior of the historic structure as required 
under I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)). 
68 1982 East, LLC v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380 (T.C. 2011), available 
at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHlstoric/1982EastLLC.TCM.WPD.pdf. 
69 Carpenter v. Commissioner, 103 T.e.M. (CCH) 1001 (T.e. 2012). Carpenter was a 
consolidated case, involving other taxpayers with substantially similar facts. Carpenter 
claimed a deduction on her 2004 return; Van Wyhe, partly on his 2004 return with 
carryovers on his 2005 and 2006 returns; the McSweens, partly on their 2003 and 2004 
returns, with carryovers on their 2004 and 2005 returns. See I.R.e. § 170(b). 
70 The Chandlers deducted a part of this amount over three tax years (2004-2006). See 
I.R.e. § 170(b). 
71 This figure represents the Dunlaps' claimed fayade easement deduction (i.e., their 
share of the total Cobblestone easement appraised value of $8,171,000). 
69. 
72 Friedberg v. Commissioner (Friedberg I), 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 356 (T.C. 2011). 
73 Gorra v. Commissioner, 106 T.C.M. (CHH) 523, slip op. at 15-16 (2013). 
74 Graev v. Commissioner, 140 T.e. 377, 384 (2013). 
75 The McSweens were taxpayers in the consolidated Carpenter case. See supra note 
76 Scheidelman v. CommIssioner (Scheidelman I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, slip op. at II 
(T .C. 20 I 0), available at http://www .ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/Scheidelman. TCM. 
WPD.pdf. 
77 Schrimsher v. Commissioner, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1329 (T.e. 2011) (The taxpayers 
deducted $193,180 in 2004 and took carryover deductions of $206,699 in 2005 and $120,724 
in 2006. The court denied the fayade easement deduction on the basis that the taxpayers did 
not receive a contemporaneous written acknowledgement of their donation as required under 
I.R.e. § 170(f)(8)). 
78 Simmons v. Commissioner, 98 T.e.M. (CCH) 57924 (T.C. 2009), ajJ'd 646 F.3d 6 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). The taxpayer had donated the larger deduction easement in 2003 and the 
other easement in 2004, taking the full deduction respectively in the applicable year. The 
Tax Court reduced these easement values to $56,250 (Logan Circle) and $42,250 (Vermont 
Avenue). 
79 Van Wyhe was a taxpayer in the consolidated Carpenter case. See supra note 69. 
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Very recently, in Zarlengo,80 the Tax Court reduced the total value of 
the fayade easement deduction claimed from $660,000 to $157,500. Even 
though the buyer of the townhouse, who did not know about the easement 
when he made an offer of $4,605,500, did not change his offer after he 
learned about the easement, the court nevertheless applied a 3.5% 
diminution to what the court determined was the townhouse's pre-easement 
value of $4.5 million when the easement was recorded in 2005. The court 
allowed a 2005 deduction of $78,750 (and any appropriate carryover 
deductions for 2006 and 2007) to Ms. Sander-Zarlengo for her one-half 
interest in the townhouse because the court held that the applicable local 
restrictions, although similar to those under federal law, were less extensive 
than the federallimitations. 81 
B. As if that weren't enough - if no deduction is allowed, I want that 
easement removed from my property and my cash contribution returned to 
me! 
Fas:ade easement charitable deductions have encouraged an increase in 
bogus deductions as a result of the "I'd like to have my cake and eat it too" 
mentality that has led to the encouragement of transfers contingent on 
receiving the charitable deduction. Both cash required donations (required 
by the charity to fund the statutorily imposed duty of monitoring the 
easement in perpetuity) and the transferred property interest (the easement 
itself) are revocable either by the consent of the parties or in the event of a 
denial of the deduction. 
In Graev,82 a 2013 case involving tax years 2004 and 2005,83 the court 
80 Zarlengo v. Commissioner, 108 T.e.M. (CCH) 155 (T.C. 2014). 
81 The taxpayers, Dr. Zarlengo and his ex-wife Ms. Sander-Zarlengo, each owned one-
half of the encumbered townhouse subject to the fayade easement and each claimed one-half 
of the total easement's value as a charitable donation. The court held that under New York 
law, a gift of a conservation easement is not complete until it is recorded; here, that 
recordation date was January 26, 2005. Also, the court held that the taxpayers had not 
satisfied the perpetuity requirement for conservation easements under I.R.C. §§ 170(h)(2)(C) 
and 170(h)(5)(A) until that date. Dr. Zarlengo had filed a joint 2004 return with his current 
wife in which he claimed his share of the easement deduction; because his 2004 return was 
the only return before the court, he was denied any deduction. By contrast, Ms. Sander-
Zarlengo's 2005-2007 returns were all under the court's jurisdiction. 
82 Graev v. Commissioner, 140 T.e. 377 (2013); see Wendy e. Gerzog, Graev: 
Conditional FQI;:ade Easement, 140 Tax Notes 1607 (Sep. 30, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstracUd=2333211. 
83 The 2005 deduction was a carryover from the 2004 easement grant due to the 
percentage limitations on current deducibility under I.R.e. § 170(b). Graev, 140 T.e. at 387. 
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84 disallowed the taxpayers' claimed easement value of $990,000. The 
easement grant had a refundable feature whereby the charity agreed to 
refund the taxpayers' easement and cash donation. The charity sent a side 
letter to the taxpayers explaining their standard policy to refund their 
donation if the taxpayers could not receive the promised favorable 
charitable deduction. Specifically, the letter promised, "to join with Graev 
to immediately remove the favade easement from the property's titie.,,85 
The court held that the potential for the Service to disallow those 
deductions and for the charity to remove the easement and return the cash to 
Graev was not so remote as to be negligible.86 The court stated that by 
filing returns with the deductions and failing to remove the refund feature 
of their donations, the taxpayers acted in response both to the Service notice 
indicating additional scrutiny applicable to overvalued favade easements 
and to the charity's second letter warning of the government's disallowance 
of a deduction for a favade easement that was coupled with a refund 
provision. Thus the court held that the risk of the government's disallowing 
the deduction was "well above 'negligible. ",87 According to the court, 
Graev required the charity'S letter with the refund feature before making his 
contribution. Also, the easement charity understood that a Service 
disallowance was more than a remote possibility and that was why it 
routinely issued comfort letters to potential donors. Thus, as conditional 
donations, the court held that the taxpayers' easement grant and cash 
donations were nondeductible.88 
84 Id. at 384. In Graev, the taxpayers also made a required cash contribution of 
$99,000. Id. at 385. 
85 Id. at 383. 
86 Id. at 393 ("Accordingly, a conservation easement fails to be 'in perpetuity' ... if, 
on the date of the donation, the possibility that the charity may be divested of its interest in 
the easement is not so remote as to be negligIble."). 
87 Id. at 397. 
88 Id. at 409. One month after Graev, in Carpenter v. Commissioner (Carpenter II), 
106 T.e.M. (CCH) 62 (T.e. 2013) available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/ 
CarpenterMemo.Haines.TCM.WPO.pdf, the Tax Court wrote a supplemental memorandum 
opinion on a motion to reconsider its 2012 memorandum opinion Carpenter v. 
Commissioner (Carpenter I), 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001 (T.C. 2012) available at 
http://www.ustaxcourt.govlInOpHistoric/CARPENTER.TCM.WPO.pdf, in light of the First 
Circuit opinion in Kaufman III. See Kaufman III discussion infra Part III.C,. Although not a 
fa~ade easement, this case involved a conservation easement that, under Colorado law, could 
be terminated through the parties' mutual consent because state law would not apply the cy 
pres doctrine to restricted gifts. As such, the court held Kaufman 11/ to be inapplicable. Thus, 
the court denied the taxpayers' motion for reconsideration. Carpenter II, slip op. at 12, 18-
23; see Wachter v. Commissioner, 142 T.e. No.7, slip op. at 6-7 (Mar. 11,2014), available 
at http://www.ustaxcourt.govlInOpHistoric/WachterOiv.Buch.TC.WPO.pdf (The court held 
that where the state restricts an easement's duration to a maximum of ninety-nine years, the 
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C. Kaufman: Four Opinions Necessary to Show a Valueless Contribution 
(Much Ado About Nothing) 
1. Kaufman I 
In Kaufman I, 89 the Tax Court granted summary judgment for the 
government on the issue of the disallowance of a charitable deduction for 
the value of the taxpayers' Boston rowhouse fa9ade easement90 because the 
easement was not granted in perpetuity.91 The court held that because the 
mortgage on the building gave first preference of proceeds distribution to 
the mortgagee rather than to the charity holding the easement, the easement 
was not granted in perpetuity. 
According to the regulations, when conditions change so that the 
perpetual easement is extinguished, the donee organization must be entitled 
its proportionate share of the proceeds.92 The taxpayers conceded that if a 
casualty occurred, the bank, as mortgagee, had a prior claim to those 
funds;93 however, they maintained as a factual matter, in those 
circumstances, they would likely have been able to satisfy both the bank 
and the charity's claims. The court rejected that reading and stated that the 
perpetuity obligation is one that does not encompass probabilities but only 
I I · 94 necessary ega reqUirements. 
conservation easement does not satisfy the perpetuity requirement of the statute. The "so 
remote as to be negligible" exception in the regulations goes to the likelihood that the 
property interest will return to the donor, regardless of the length of time it takes for the 
reversion to take effect). 
89 Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman I), 134 T.C. 182 (2010). 
90 The taxpayers had claimed a charitable deduction of $220,800 related to their 
easement grant, which because of the income percentage restrictions on current year 
deductibility in I.R.C. § 170(b)(1 )(C), had to be partially deducted in the following year, 
2004. Kaufman fat 184. 
91 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C), (5)(A); Treas. Reg. § I. I 70A-14(a), (g)(6)(ii) (2009). The 
court denied the government summary judgment on the other two issues: (I) the 
deductibility of the conditional cash gift to the charity and (2) the taxpayers' accuracy related 
penalty liability under I.R.C. § 6662 because of the presence of genuine issues of material 
fact. Kaufman fat 182-84. 
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)(2009). 
93 Kaufman f at 186. 
94 ld. at 186-87. Kaufman f can be contrasted with frby v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 
371,382-83 (2012) (where the source of funds for a bargain sale creating the conservation 
easement were grants from governmental entities that must use the proceeds "in a manner 
consistent with the original conservation purposes of the [donors'] contribution .... "). 
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2. Kaufman II 
In Kaufman 11,95 the Tax Court reviewed its partial summary judgment 
in favor of the government and decided the two factual issues (the 
taxpayers' cash contributions and related penalties) that it had earlier held 
could not be decided by summary judgment. The court allowed both parties 
to amend their positions on the taxpayers' 2003 and 2004 cash charitable 
deductions,96 which in tum caused a reassignment of their respective 
burdens of proof. After its amendments, the government bore the burden of 
proof regarding the increased deficiency and penalty for 2004 from its 
disallowing the $3,032 deduction, and the quid pro quo ground for 
disallowing the taxpayers' 2003 $16,840 cash contribution deduction, as it 
97 represented new matter for the taxpayers to rebut. 
The court in Kaufman 11 reviewed its grant of partial summary 
judgment for the government that denied any deduction for the taxpayers' 
fas;ade easement contribution because it did not satisfy the perpetuity 
requirements outlined in the regulations98 and was not a qualified 
conservation contribution under section 170(h)(I). The taxpayers contended 
that the agreement in fact required enforcement in perpetuity as defined in 
the regulations.99 The government maintained that the combination of the 
easement and lender agreement did not comply with the extinguishment 
" . hi' 100 provIsIOn III t e regu atlOns. 
The court first cited to the treatise Powell on Real Property wherein 
Powell wrote, "a conservation easement may be terminated without the 
consent of the holder: through the foreclosure of a pre-existing mortgage or 
mechanic's lien on property subsequently encumbered by the easement."IOI 
The court then explained that no deduction is permitted for an interest 
subject to a mortgage unless the mortgagee subordinates its property rights 
95 Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman 11), 136 T.C. 294 (2011); see Wendy C. 
Gerzog, Mortgage and Conservation Easements: Not a Good Mix, 132 TAX NOTES 437 (July 
25, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=1894739. 
96 In May 2010, before the trial, petitioners amended their petition, claiming a 2004 
deduction of $16,840. In June 2010, after the trial, the government amended its answer to 
increase the taxpayers' 2004 deficiency and to assess an accuracy-related penalty. Both 
parties agree that the $300 bank fee Kaufman paid to NAT is nondeductible. Kaufman 11 at 
314. 
97 ld. at 315. 
98 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) (2009); Kaufman 1 at 187. 
99 Kaufman 11 at 302 (referring to Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(2) and (3)). 
100 Kaufman 11 at 302-03 (referring to Income Tax Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)); see Wall 
v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1906 (T.e. 2012) (same issue with the same result). 
101 Kaufman 11 at 304 (although Powell also explains that public policy considerations 
may make the doctrine inapplicable). 
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to the donee organization's perpetual conservation enforcement obligation. 
The court discussed an exception that provides a deduction will not be 
disallowed if an event that could defeat the interest from passing to the 
charity is only remotely likely to occur. 102 However, the regulations did not 
conceive of a mortgage failure as a remote event and the court emphasized 
that the charity'S property rights must remain the same even when there are 
changed conditions and an extinguishment of the easement. Thus, on a sale, 
exchange, or involuntary conversion, the charity must retain its 
proportionate share of the proceeds. The court interpreted the 
extinguishment regulations to require that "the donee have a right to a share 
of the proceeds and not merely a contractual claim against the owner of the 
. I' ,,103 prevIOUS y servient estate. 
The first of the two new issues in Kaufman II was the deductibility of 
the taxpayers' conditional cash contributions to the charity. The charity had 
sent a letter to the taxpayers stating that easement donors were required to 
contribute a cash endowment to the charity equal to ten percent of the value 
of the tax deduction. The letter explained that the cash contribution would 
cover the present and future costs of monitoring the donation in 
perpetuity.104 In addition, the letter explained that if the taxpayers did not 
qualify for a charitable deduction, the donors and the charity would join 
together to void the easement and the donors would be reimbursed for their 
. I d h 'b' 105 appralsa costs an cas contn utton. 
102 Id. at 305 (citing Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-14(g)(l)-(3)). Although the taxpayers 
argued the applicability of the regulation's remote and negligible" standard protects against 
the possibility that "events of such low probability will defeat the donee's interest in the 
servient property," but that the regulation also does not address compensatIOn on actual 
defeasance. The court explained that: "unlike the risk addressed by the so-remote-as-to-be-
negligible standard, in order to satisfy the extinguishment provision, section 1.170A-
14(g)(6) ... provides that the donee must ab initio have an absolute nght to compensatIon 
from the postextinguishment proceeds for the restrictions judicially extinguished. It is Lorna 
Kaufman's failure to accord NAT an absolute right to a fixed share of the 
postextinguishment proceeds that causes her gift to fail the extinguishment provision. Id. at 
312-13. 
103 Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman 11), 136 T.C. 294, 309 (2011). 
104 Id. at 297. The form indicated that if the donation could not be processed in time to 
qualify for a deduction in 2003, the charity would allow a ten percent reduction in the cash 
contribution to the donor once the process was completed in 2004. Id. 
105 Id. In a subsequent letter, the charity explained that the required cash donation 
would be discounted by ten percent because the taxpayers had been delayed in filing their 
2003 tax return because of the uncompleted easement contribution. That resulted in a 
discounted cash contribution of $19,872, plus fees of $300, with a net amount due of $3,332. 
That amount was due after the easement had received National Park Service certification, 
which occurred August 9, 2004. The taxpayers submitted the required payment to the 
charity, which in turn sent an I.R.S. Form 8283, substantiating the facade easement 
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The government denied the taxpayers' deductions of cash contributions 
to the charity because it asserted they were quid pro quo for the services the 
charity provided regarding the fac;ade easement deductions and because 
they were conditional on subsequent events (the value of the easement or 
the allowance of a deduction). In its reply brief, the government agreed that 
the "expected receipt of a tax deduction is not a benefit that invalidates the 
deduction" but argued that the deduction must be disallowed because the 
payments were required. I06 The government also denied a deduction for 
$3,032 of the 2004 cash payment to the charity, asserting the taxpayers had 
"relied on a contemporaneous written acknowledgment that they knew was 
inaccurate in claiming the erroneous charitable deduction."I07 The 
taxpayers contended that although the payments may have been subject to a 
refund, in 2004 they became fixed and deductible because the parties' 
understanding was that the cash contributions were not refundable. The 
taxpayers argued that the requirement of a cash contribution was a 
customary practice and was what allowed the charity and similar 
organizations to have operating funds to administer their easements, and 
that the cash donation was not conditional on the charity'S approval of the 
easement and provision of a Form 8283. \08 
The court found that before the 2004 appraisal it was possible for the 
easement to be valued at zero. Therefore, the court held that the taxpayers 
had not satisfied their burden of proof that they were entitled to a cash 
contribution deduction for 2003. 109 However, the court agreed with the 
taxpayers that the clause in the agreement setting cash payments at ten 
percent of the donation value was not intended to allow for a refund if the 
taxpayers' deductions were disallowed. I 10 Furthermore, the court agreed 
with the government that Hernandez lll requires payments to be 
"unrequited" for them to be deductible. However, the court pointed out that 
neither party had cited any precedent to support its more specific argument, 
making it difficult for the court to find any benefit accruing to the taxpayers 
from the cash contribution apart from its enabling the charitable 
contribution. Therefore, the court allowed the taxpayers a 2004 cash 
charitable contribution deduction for $19,872. 112 
contribution. Id. at 300-01. 
106 136 T.C.at317 
107 Id.at315. 
108 ld. at 315-18. 
109 ld. at 316 ("Petitioners bear the burden of proving that, at the end of 2003, the 
possibility of a zero appraisal value was not so remote as to be negligible."). 
110 ld. at 316-17. 
III Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
112 Kaufman II at 320-22. The court noted that in another case, McMillan v. 
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The second new issue in Kaufman 11 was the imposition of various 
penalties, 113 for which the government bore the burden of proof. I 14 Because 
of government concessions and because the taxpayers proved reasonable 
cause and good faith, a statutory defense to the penalties,115 the court 
upheld only the accuracy-related penalty. The court found the taxpayers had 
been negligent in their 2003 underpayment attributable to the taxpayers' 
cash contributions to the charity. 
3. Kaufman III 
116 In Kaufman III, both the government and the taxpayers appealed the 
2010 and 2011 Tax Court decisions (Kaufman 1 & I/). The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's judgments, apart from its 
holding on the deductibility of the taxpayers' cash contributions and the 
accuracy-related penalty on the 2003 cash contribution claim, and remanded 
the case for the lower court to determine the other issues consistent with the 
11 ' d .. 117 appe ate court s eClSlOn. 
In its brief background summary, the appellate court described the 
taxpayers' need to have their mortgagee agree to subordinate its interest to 
the easement charity. In their letter to the mortgagee, they stated that the 
easement imposed basically the same restrictions as those imposed under 
Commissioner, 31 T.e. 1143 (1959), it had disallowed a deduction for a required fee paid to 
a charity to place an adopted child in the taxpayers' home. In that case, the taxpayers' 
payment significantly mUTed to their benefit. By contrast, the court explamed that Kaufman's 
cash payment to the charity only served to assist her to obtain a charitable deduction and no 
other benefit. Kaufman 11 at 318, n.12. Moreover, the court cited Scheldelman v. 
Commissioner (Scheidelman I), 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 24, slip op. at II (T.e. 2010), available 
at http://www. ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpH istoric/Scheidelman. TCM. WPD. pdf, involving a similar 
cash payment to the same easement charity in which the court denied a taxpayer deduction. 
However, in Scheidelman I, the taxpayers had the burden of proof to show the extent to 
which their payment exceeded the value of their benefit, and they failed to produce any 
evidence to show that excess. Here, the government had to prove quid pro quo, and the court 
found the evidence ambiguous. Finally, the government failed to provide evidence of the 
value of Kaufman's benefit and failed to show that the taxpayers had not substantiated their 
contribution as required by statute. Kaufman 11 at 319. 
113 I.R.C. § 6662. 
114 I.R.C. § 7491(c). 
115 I.R.e. § 6662 (c). 
116 Kaufman v. Shulman (Kaufman 111), 687 F.3d 21 (1st CiT. 2012). 
117 Id. at 33. Because the Tax Court's decision not to impose penalties in connection 
with the claimed noncash contributions were intertwined with its grant of partial summary 
judgment in Kaufman 11, the appellate court also vacated the Tax Court's holdings on that 
issue. Id. at 30. In addition, the court also held that each party was liable for its own court 
costs. Id. at 33. 
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local law. The court then stated that, if that assertion were true, then the 
mortgagee "would lose little or nothing by consenting.,,118 Likewise, when 
Mr. Kaufman worried that the easement would reduce the property's value 
to a degree that would undermine the tax benefit from the charitable 
deduction, the charity's representative "sought to reassure him that it was 
'very unlikely' that the easement would affect the marketability of the 
property.,,119 The taxpayers received the mortgagee's agreement to 
subordinate its rights to the charity's right to enforce the easement in 
perpetuity. However, the lender agreement contained a stipulation that gave 
the mortgagee a prior claim to insurance proceeds from a casualty on, or a 
d . f h 120 con emnatlOn 0 ,t e property. 
The circuit court's legal analysis of the conservation easement 
charitable deduction statute and regulations focused on the subsection (g) of 
the income tax regulation 121 and specifically paragraph (g)(6) that, the court 
said, the Tax Court had "relied entirely on" to disallow the taxpayers' 
fac;ade easement deduction. l22 The court described what it considered to be 
the two reasons for the extinguishment provision that requires that the 
charity be entitled to its pro rata share of insurance proceeds: to prevent a 
windfall to the easement donor and to insure that the charity could use its 
share to pursue its charitable purpose elsewhere. 123 
The circuit court's reading of the Tax Court's opinion was that 
although the taxpayers had ostensibly satisfied the extinguishment 
regulation, the lender agreement provision between the taxpayers and the 
mortgagee prevents such compliance by granting the mortgagee a superior 
claim to the easement charity regarding casualty and condemnation 
insurance proceeds. Regarding the Tax Court's reading, the appellate court 
stated that the taxpayers had no power over the mortgagee just as they had 
no power over a preferential federal or state tax lien. 124 In so doing, the 
circuit court did not recognize any difference between a statutory preference 
and one derived by private parties to a contract. 
Further, the circuit court stated that "the IRS's reading of its regulation 
would appear to doom practically all donations of easements, which is 
118 Id. at 24. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g) (2009). 
122 Kaufman III at 26. As noted by the court and the taxpayers, moreover, the paragraph 
applies only where an extinguishment is "by judicial proceeding." Id. at 26 n.3. 
123 Id. at 26. 
124 Id. at 26-27. 
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surely contrary to the purpose of Congress.,,125 While that may be true, such 
an inference may not be accurate because almost all fayade easement 
deductions are taken by very wealthy individuals. 126 Fayade easement 
holders may either have more clout with their mortgagees than the 
taxpayers in Kaufman or most fayade easement donors may not have the 
financial need to carry a mortgage on their property. 
Finally, the court rejected the government's reading of an easement 
provision 127 that it said the government had misinterpreted to mean that the 
charity had a "blank check" to consent to any statutorily disallowed 
activity. The appellate court seemed to consider that provision as having no 
legal effect, that is, as surplusage. Basically, the First Circuit aligned itself 
with the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Simmons 128 and agreed that charitable 
deductions "cannot be disallowed based upon the remote possibility [that 
the donee organization] will abandon the easements." 129 
Ultimately, the main thrust of the circuit court opinion was that the 
case rested on factual findings and therefore granting summary judgment 
was inappropriate. In its discussion of the taxpayers' valuation 
overstatement, the court seemed to warm to the government's contention 
that the easement was valueless, as illustrated by the following court 
statements: (1) "[g]iven these pre-existing legal obligations the Tax Court 
might well find on remand that the Kaufmans' easement was worth little or 
nothing[,],,130 and (2) "[i]n an effort to reassure them, a Trust representative 
told the Kaufmans that experience showed that such easements did not 
reduce resale value, and this could easily be the IRS's opening argument in 
a valuation trial.,,131 Finally, the court stated, "we do not question the IRS's 
concern, transcending this case, that individuals and organizations have 
125 Id. at 27 (Because of the cirCUIt court's holding on the mortgage subrogation, several 
Tax Court cases filed a motion for reconsideration); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Commissioner, 106 
T.e.M. (CCH) 215 (T.C. 2013) (motion to vacate decision and reconsider the court's earlier 
opinion in Mitchell v. Commissioner (Mitchell 1), 138 T.e. 324 (2012) denied, with the 
court's holding that Kaufman III decided legal issues (the application of the proceeds 
regulation) different from the one in Mitchell 1 (application of the subordination 
regulation).». 
126 See infra Part III.C.Kaufman IV; supra notes 124,38, text in Part I. 
127 The easement agreement states, "[N]othing herem contained shall be construed to 
limit the [Trust's] right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in the Fayade) or to abandon 
some or all of its rights hereunder." Kaufman 111 at 27-28. 
128 Commissioner v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.e. Cir. 2011). 
129 Id. at 10, cited in Kaufman 111 at 28. 
130 Kaufman 111 at 31. 
131 Id. The appellate court also noted that the charity "had a substantial economic 
incentive" to strive for "a high valuation" due to its cash contributIOn requirement geared to 
ten percent of the easement's value. Id. at 32. 
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been abusing the conservation statute "to improperly shield income or 
assets from taxation.,,132 
4. Kaufman IV 
In Kaufman IV, 133 the Tax Court held that each party's appraisal was 
admissible, but that the taxpayers' expert's valuation approach was 
defective and that the court would not give it any weight. Thus, the 
taxpayers had not proved their fas;ade easement donation had any value. In 
addition, the Tax Court imposed a gross valuation penalty on the taxpayers 
because they had not proved they were entitled to the defense of reasonable 
d c. . h 134 cause or goo Lalt . 
On remand from the appellate court, the Tax Court supplemented its 
findings of fact and opinion. The court found the following facts regarding 
taxpayers' appraisal. The taxpayers employed Timothy J. Hanlon, one of 
the two appraisers recommended by the charity. Mr. Hanlon had written 
nine reports valuing fas;ade easements for the charity in 2003 and 2004, but 
had no other experience appraising partial real property interests. Mr. 
Hanlon spoke with someone at the charity in connection with his first such 
appraisal and his notes from that discussion indicate that with respect to 
fas;ade easements in heavily regulated areas, the Service has accepted a 
value of about eleven percent of the property's value, that "95% fall in this 
132 ld. (The court then cited to both I.R.S. News Release lR-2005-19 (Feb. 28, 2005) 
and I.R.S. News Release, lR-2006-25 (Feb. 7, 2006) (repeating language from 2005 news 
release) and to the "formidable" penalties assessed against taxpayers abusing the deduction 
statute). 
133 Kaufman v. Commissioner (Kaufman IV), 107 T.e.M. (CCH) 1262 (T.C. 2014), 
available at http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/lnOpHistoric/KaufmanMemo.Halpern.TCM.WPD. 
pdf. 
134 Other court fa9ade easement examples of protracted litigation similar to the four 
Kaufman opinions are the four opinion cases Scheidelman, supra notes 10, 18, 51, 76, and 
112, and WhiteHouse Hotel. WhiteHouse Hotel v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 112, 118, 172, 
176 (2008) (The taxpayer's 1999 claimed deduction was $7,445,000 reduced by the court to 
$1,792,30Iand resulting in the taxpayer's liability for a 40 percent gross valuation 
misstatement penalty. "Therefore, on the 1997 Form 1065, the partnership claimed an 
amount for the value of the servitude slightly more than 415 percent of its correct value"), 
vacated and remanded, 615 F.3d 321, 324 (5th Cir. 2010), (with the Tax Court on remand 
valuing the fa9ade easement at $1,857,716, subject to the forty percent penalty. See 
Whitehouse Hotel v. Commissioner, 139 T.e. 304, 348, 361-62 (2012)), aJJ'd in part (on the 
valuation issue) and vacated in part and remanded (on the penalty issue), _ F.3d _ (5th 
Cir. 2014) (reversing as clearly erroneous, the court stated, "Obtaining a qualified appraisal, 
analyzing that appraisal, commissioning another appraisal, and submitting a professionally-
prepared tax return is sufficient to show a good faith investigation as required by law."). 
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135 percentage," and that he "could use 11.5%-12.5%." 
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Mr. Kaufman, a professor emeritus of the Sloan School of Management 
at M.LT, a specialist in statistical analysis,136 emailed a representative of 
the charity that he was concerned about the resale devaluation of a fayade 
burdened home and asked for statistical documentation on the potential for 
such an effect. In response, the charity's representative emailed him that 
there would be no valuation loss created by the easement. 
We have tracked 26 resold properties to-date on which we held an 
easement, andnone was resold at a loss or had any issues for resale 
that we are aware of .... Over 100 lenders have approved to 
subordinate their loans to our easements to-date in over 800 cases. 
* * * Why would these banks (including yours) approve these 
transactions if they saw a risk or adverse financial impact on their 
collateral? ?* * *One of our directors, Steve McClain, owns 
fifteen or so historic properties and has taken advantage of this tax 
deduction himself. He would have never granted any easement if 
he thought there would be a risk or loss of value in his 
. 137 propertIes. 
In a letter to their mortgagee, moreover, the taxpayers stated: "[t]he 
easement restrictions are essentially the same restrictions as those imposed 
by current local ordinances that govern this property.,,138 
The government's expert, John C. Bowman III, a Massachusetts 
certified general real estate appraiser, held a Certificate of Completion for 
the Valuation of Conservation Easements program offered by the American 
Society of Appraisers and had served on the Boston Landmarks 
Commission for ten years, serving as chairman of the commission for six 
years. "He ha[ d] extensive experience appraising partial interests in real 
property, including conservation easements.,,139 Mr. Bowman reviewed 
both the Hanlon appraisal and an appraisal prepared by Joan Gootee, a 
Service employee. His preliminary view on the Hanlon appraisal was that 
there was no devaluation related to development potential since the property 
was being used at its highest and best use as a single-family home. In 
determining the value of the easement, Hanlon used a percentage discount 
to the unencumbered value of the property and made no appraisal of the 
"after" easement value despite his acknowledging that the "before and 
135 Kaufman IV slip op. at 7-9. 
136 Id. slip op. at 4. 
137 Id. slip op. at 11. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. slip op. at 13. 
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after" approach was the correct appraisal method for conservation 
easements. 140 Further, Bowman agreed with the conclusion of the Gootee 
appraisal that the easement duplicated local historic building restrictions. 
For those reasons, Bowman concluded that the fa~ade easement value was 
141 zero. 
The court's opinion began with a discussion of which party held the 
burden of proof on the value of the fa~ade easement, but ultimately held it 
need not decide that issue because the court was able to determine "the 
valuation question on the basis of essentially agreed facts along with the 
assistance we may find helpful in the parties' expert's opinions.,,142 On the 
penalties issue, by statute,143 the government has the burden of production; 
but, if it has met that burden, the taxpayers have the burden to prove that 
they should not be subject to those penalties due to reasonable cause. 144 
Next, the court addressed the valuation issue. The fair market value of 
a conservation easement is its value at contribution. Where there are no 
significant comparable sales, the easement's value is determined by 
subtracting the "after" (encumbered) value of the property from the 
"before" (unencumbered) value of the property. The taxpayers contended 
that its value was $220,800, while the government asserted its value was 
145 zero. 
In great detail, the court discussed each expert's report and 
methodology. The court found that the experts were qualified experts but 
expressed concern about the close relationship between Hanlon and the 
charity.146 The court also stated that the charity had an interest in 
140 Id. slip op. at 14. 
141 ld. 
142 ld. slip op. at 16. 
143 I.R.C. § 7491(c). 
144 Kaufman IV slip op. at 17. 
145 Id. slip op. at 18. 
146 ld. slip op. at 47 ("What does concern us with respect to Mr. Hanlon's qualification 
to testify, however, is his close relationship With NAT. His only experience in appraising 
facade easements is the nine reports that he did with respect to nine facade-easement 
contributions to NAT. He looked to NAT to learn how appraisals of facade easements were 
done before he attempted the first of those reports, and he submitted a draft of the first report 
to NAT for validation before he completed it. He incorporated in his reports wording 
suggested by NAT. After he completed eight reports, NAT's director of operations, Ms. 
Bookwalter, expressed NAT's satisfaction with his work but required that he add a document 
(the easement document) to all future reports. The tone of her communication to him 
suggests that she believed that NAT had a proprietary interest in Mr. Hanlon's reports. She 
begins her communication by speaking of "the 8 appraisals you have done for the National 
Architectural Trust". (Emphasis added.) Without asking permission from him, she says that 
NAT would add the easement document to the reports he had already submitted. She 
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overvaluing an easement due to its ten percent required cash donation and 
that Mr. Hanlon would benefit by the charity's continued recommendation 
fh · . 147 o 1m as an appraIser. 
The court found that Hanlon's valuation was primarily based on 
imposing a percentage on the pre-contribution value of the property. That 
percentage was derived from unsubstantiated and generalized conclusions 
of a report the charity provided to him. The court rejected Hanlon's 
methodology since even he had conceded "that his deconstruction of the 
15% upper bound in the Primoli article into smaller, component percentages 
reflective of the burdens imposed by a facade easement was a method 
unique to him and not a generally accepted appraisal practice or valuation 
method.,,148 Likewise, the court rejected similar, unsubstantiated additional 
percentages that Hanlon applied to value the easement. 149 
On the other hand, the court found the testimony of the government's 
expert, Bowman, more reliable. Bowman concluded "that the typical buyer 
would find the restrictions of the preservation restriction no more 
burdensome than the underlying South End Landmark District Standards 
and Criteria" and that the fayade easement had no value. 150 The court 
thanked him for his work and expressed NAT's expectation that it would work with him in 
the future."). 
147 Id. slip op. at 48-49. 
148 Id. slip op. at 50-51 (The court stated, "Mr. Hanlon's starting pOInt-that properties 
in lightly regulated areas suffer a 15% reduction in value on account of the severance and 
conveyance of a facade easement-is based on neither reliable market data nor specific 
attributes of the property. It is based on what he believes the courts and the IRS had allowed 
in prior cases. Whether it is an upper or lower bound, there is no standard percentage to 
which one may make adjustments to arrive at a value appropriate for a particular property."). 
149 Id. slip op. at 52-53 ("When asked how he came to the conclusion that the 
marketability of property would be diminished by 2%, he answered: "[I]1's common sense" 
that the more restricted property "is going to have lower marketability." He did not, 
however, explain how he got to 2%. He testified that he based the 0.5% that he assigned to 
"recapture" on "what I felt the limitation on marketability would be." As to the 1.25% he 
assigned to "maintenance and insurance requirements in excess of unencumbered 
properties", he admitted that he did no analysis to arrive at that figure and "just chose" it. 
Similarly, with respect to the 0.5% assigned to "legal exposure if easement is breached": 
"just judgment." Simply put, given his limited experience appraising facade easements and 
his apparent preconception that the component percentages would total 15% in a lightly 
regulated area, we are not persuaded that Mr. Hanlon's common sense, feelings, and 
judgment constitute a reliable basis for the percentage reductions in value that he assigned to 
each of the constituent burdens constituting a facade easement (and, further, the adjustments 
he made to those percentages to reflect differences between the burdens imposed by the 
South End Standards and Criteria and the burdens imposed by the preservation 
agreement)."). 
150 Id. slip op. at 55. 
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compared the easement restrictions with the limitations imposed by local 
law and held that the taxpayers had not shown that the easement reduced 
the value of the property. "To the contrary, our own comparison of the two 
sets of restrictions and Mr. Bowman's expert testimony [has] convinced us 
that the restrictive components of the preservation agreement are basically 
duplicative of, and not materially different from, the South End Standards 
and Criteria, and we so find." 151 
An accuracy-related twenty percent penaltyl52 is imposed where an 
income tax underpayment is due to negligence, a substantial understatement 
or a substantial valuation misstatement. 153 Where there is a gross valuation 
. 154 hI' fi 155 A b d mIsstatement, t e pena ty IS orty percent. taxpayer may e excuse 
from the penalty upon reasonable cause and good faith;156 however, that 
exception is only available when the taxpayer's valuation was based on a 
"qualified appraisal" by a "qualified appraiser" and the taxpayer made a 
good-faith investigation of the value of the contributed property.157 In 
Kaufman, the government argued for the imposition of a forty percent 
penalty; the taxpayers claimed they fell within the reasonable cause 
exception and thus should be exempt from the penalty. 158 
Although the court found that Mr. Hanlon was a qualified appraiser as 
defined by the statute,159 it also found that the taxpayers did not satisfy the 
good faith investigation requirement of the exemption. 160 The taxpayers 
looked to the charity's emails to prove they were not liable for the penalty; 
yet, those very emails indicated that they knew the imposition of a fac;ade 
easement would not devalue their property. 161 In determining good faith 
reliance, the court considers a taxpayer's educational background and 
experience. In this instance, Mr. "Kaufman was a sophisticated consumer of 
151 Id. slip op. at 63. 
152 I.R.C. § 6662. 
153 A substantial misstatement is where the claimed value is 200 percent or more of the 
correct value of the property. See I.R.C. § 6662(e)(1)(8)(i). 
154 A gross misstatement is where the claimed value is 400 percent or more of the 
correct value of the property. See I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1)-(2). 
155 I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1). 
156 I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1). 
157 I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2)-(3). 
158 Kaufman IV slIp op. at 66. 
159 Id. at 71; see I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2)(A). 
160 Kaufman IV slip op. at 72. 
161 Id. slip op. at 73-74. The taxpayers also claimed that they relied on their accountant 
for the valuation overstatement; however, the court pointed out that "the value of the facade 
easement involves an issue (valuation) on which [their accountant] neither was qualified to 
advise petitioners nor advised them." Id. slip op. at 77. 
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statistical analyses, and both the [charity's representative's] email and the 
Hanlon appraisal gave him good reason to question Mr. Hanlon's value 
conclusion." 162 
IV. THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006 
The PP A made numerous changes specifically to the fayade easement 
charitable deduction provisions. First, not only the front of a historic 
b h · . 163 b b' h d . structure, ut t e entire extenor must e su ~ect to t e easement an 1tS 
restrictions. 164 According to its legislative history, to be a qualified real 
property interest, the entire exterior refers to "the space above the building, 
the sides, the rear, and the front of the building" 165 and no part of the 
exterior may be changed in a way "inconsistent with the historical character 
of such exterior." 166 The PP A requires substantiation that the charitable 
organization is a qualified recipient with "the resources to manage and 
enforce the restriction and a commitment to do SO.,,167 Further, appraisal 
162 ld. slip op. at 80. AlternatIvely, the court upheld the accuracy related penalties 
imposed because of negligence or a substantial misstatement as defined under I.R.C. 
§ 6662(e)(l)(A). The court cited to both Mr. Kaufman's disregard of the error in the Hanlon 
appraisal and the taxpayers' carelessness in certifying to the mortgagee that the easement 
restrictions were virtually the same as those imposed by local law while they were 
simultaneously claiming large deductions attributable solely to the easement's restrictions. 
ld. slip op. at 81-82. The court rejected the taxpayers' argument that there was substantial 
authority to support their positions and that they had a reasonable basis for their tax 
treatment. ld. slip op. at 85. Finally, the court held that the government met its burden of 
production on the issue of the existence of substantial understatements and that the taxpayers 
did not prove either reasonable cause or good faith exceptions for their understatements. ld. 
slip op. at 86. 
163 LR.C. § l70(h)(4)(8)(i)(I) ("including the front, sides, rear, and height of the 
building"). 
164 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(8)(i)(II) ("prohibits any change in the exterior of the building 
which is inconsIstent with the historical character of such exterior"). 
165 H.R. REP. No. 109-455, at 145 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 H. CONF. REP.]; STAFF OF 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., GEN EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED 
IN THE 109TH CONG., 590 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter 2007 JOINT COMM. 
EXPLANATION)' 
166 LR.C. § 170(h)(4)(8)(i)(II); see 2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165; 2007 JOINT 
COMM. EXPLANATION, supra, note 165. 
167 LR.C. § 170(h)(4)(8)(ii) (I)-(lI); see 2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165 ("In 
addition, the donor and the donee must enter into a written agreement certifying, under 
penalty of perjury, that the donee is a qualIfied organization, with a purpose of 
environmental protection, land conservation, open space preservation, or historic 
preservation, and that the donee has the resources to manage and enforce the restriction and a 
commitment to do so."). 
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. . h d 168· I d· . . I·fi d . I 169 reqUIrements were hg tene, mc u mg requmng qua I Ie appralsa s 
by certified appraisers. 170 The appraiser must sign a declaration that he or 
she is aware of the penalty imposed on the appraiser who should have 
known that the appraisal was being used as part of a tax return or refund 
claim if the appraisal results in a substantial overvaluation. The legislation 
imposes a $500 enforcement fee to be paid to the Service on a donor 
claiming the deduction for a fayade easement valued at the greater of: three 
percent of the property's fair market value or $10,000. 171 Finally, for 
property receiving or having received a rehabilitation tax credit l72 for the 
past five years, there is a requirement that the additional benefit of the 
fayade easement deduction be reduced. 173 At the same time, the PP A added 
168 I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(B)(iii) (stating that the taxpayer must include "with the taxpayer's 
return for the taxable year of the contribution- (I) a qualified appraisal (within the meaning 
of subsection (f)(ll)(E)) of the qualified property interest, (II) photographs of the entire 
exterior of the building, and (III) a description of all restrictions on the development of the 
building."). 2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165 states that: 
For any contribution relating to a registered historic district made after the date 
of enactment of the provision, taxpayers must include with the return for the 
taxable year of the contribution a qualIfied appraisal of the qualified real property 
interest (irrespective of the claimed value of such interest) and attach the 
appraisal with the taxpayer's return, photographs of the entire exterior of the 
building, and descriptions of all current restrictions on development of the 
building, including, for example, zoning laws, ordinances, neighborhood 
association rules, restrictive covenants, and other similar restrictions. Failure to 
obtain and attach an appraisal or to include the required information results in 
disallowance of the deduction. 
2006 H. CONF. REP., supra note 165, at 338; see I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advisory 201334039 
(Aug. 23, 2013). 
169 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(i). 
170 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii), (iii). 
171 I.R.C. § 170(f)(13) ("Contributions of certain interests in buildings located in 
registered historic districts - (A) In general -No deductIon shall be allowed with respect to 
any contribution described in subparagraph (B) unless the taxpayer includes with the return 
for the taxable year of the contribution a $500 filing fee. (B) Contribution described - A 
contribution is described in this subparagraph if such contribution is a qualified conservation 
contribution (as defined in subsection (h)) which is a restriction with respect to the exterior 
of a building described in subsection (h)(4)(C)(ii) and for which a deduction is claimed in 
excess of $10,000. (C) Dedication of fee -Any fee collected under this paragraph shall be 
used for the enforcement of the provisions of subsection (h)."). See 2006 H. CONF. REp., 
supra note 165, at 338-39. 
172 I.R.C. § 47. 
173 I.R.C. § 170(f)(l4) ("In the case of any qualified conservation contribution (as 
defined in subsection (h)), the amount of the deduction allowed under this section shall be 
reduced by an amount which bears the same ratio to the fair market value of the contribution 
as- (A) the sum of the credits allowed to the taxpayer under section 47 for the 5 preceding 
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what was at that time a two-year provision (for 2006 and 2007) to increase 
the percentage limitations on current year deductibility of noncash capital 
gain real property conservation contributions from thirty to fifty percent; 174 
that temporary provision has been extended in two-year intervals with the 
most recent amendment retaining the benefit through 2013. 175 
V. REPEAL, NOT REFORM: POST-PPA PROPOSALS 
There have been legislative efforts to reform conservation easements, 
including fa~ade easements. Some have been enacted into law; other good 
efforts have not. 176 However, what is clear in the constant patching or "fine 
taxable years with respect to any building which is a part of such contribution, bears to (B) 
the fair market value of the building on the date of the contribution"). That is, the reduced 
donation deduction amount is calculated by multiplying the value of the fa<;ade easement by 
the fraction that is the same ratio as the sum of those credits for the past five years to the 
building's value when the fa<;ade easement contributIOn was made. 
If the aggregate amount of credits claimed by the taxpayer within such five year 
period is $100,000, and the fair market value of the building with respect to 
which the contribution is made is $1,000,000, the taxpayer must reduce the 
amount of the deduction by 10 percent (or 100,000 over 1,000,000). 
2007 JOINT COMM . EXPLANATION, supra note 165, at 591 . 
174 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1206(a), 120 Stat. 780, 
1068-69 (2006) (codified at I.R.e. § 170(b)(I )(E)). This is an exception to the thirty percent 
limitation under Inter I.R.C. § I 70(b)(I )(8). The 100 percent limitation under 
§ 170(b)(l)(E)(iv), also enacted as part of the PPA, is only applicable to "qualified farmers 
and ranchers" as defined in section 170(b)(I)(E)(v). See I.R.S. Notice 2007-50, 2007-1 e.B. 
1430 (providing guidance on the PPA percentage limitations). 
175 I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(vi), as enacted in the PPA, was a two-year provisIOn that was 
intended to last through 2007. The statute has been extended several times so that the current 
provision, enacted in the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, currently extends through 
2013. American Taxpayer Rehef Act of2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 206(a), 126 Stat. 2313, 
2324 (2013). Conservation Easement Incentive Act of2014, H.R. 2807, 113TH CONGo (2013) 
seeks to make the provision a permanent one. See Bill Summary & Status, LIBR. OF CONG., 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dI13:HR02807:@@@D&summ2=m& 
(last action Jun. 26, 2014) (showing the current status of the bill). 
176 See, e.g., 2005 JOINT COMM. FA<;:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 284 (an 
example of a proposal that was not enacted into law). The Tax Court, in Glass court referred 
to the 2005 Joint Committee proposal and stated that the Committee characterized section 
170(h) as too broad to enable the government to dispute a taxpayer's claim of a conservation 
purpose, particularly because both the donor and donee are motivated to agree on that 
characterization. See Glass V. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 258, 285 n.19 (2005) (citing 2005 
JOINT COMM. F A<;:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 286). The Glass court stated 
that the proposal would not only require the "protection of natural habitats" purpose in 
section 170(h)(4)(A)(li) be tied to "a clearly defined governmental policy; i.e., it furthers a 
specific, identified conservation project," but also would deny the donor or his family the 
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tuning" of this Code section is that abuse is unavoidable and that there are 
better ways to provide a public benefit. Clearly, repeal is warranted. l77 
One major positive effort for partial repeal of the fa<;ade easement was 
the 2005 Joint Committee proposal. The Committee's recommendation 
provided that there would be no deduction for the contribution of a historic 
fa<;ade easement "relating to a certified historic structure that recently has 
been or is being used or is reasonably expected to be used, by the donor or a 
family member of the donor as a personal residence (principal or 
otherwise).,,178 For historic buildings not having a personal residence use, 
such as commercial, rental, or investment property, the Committee's 
recommendation was not for repeal and was more complex. For those 
easements, its proposal allowed a charitable deduction equal to the lesser of 
5% of the value of the building (ignoring the existence of the easement) or 
33% of the fa<;ade easement's value. The proposal contained recapture rules 
if the property was converted to personal residential use within eleven years 
of the contribution. 179 Donors would be required to report the conversion 
both to the Service and to the donee easement holder. 180 
While the Committee's proposal is a vast improvement over current 
law, its nonresidential use recommendation both incorporates the ever-
problematic valuation issuel81 of a fa<;ade easement (due to the thirty-three 
percent alternative) and may engender enforcement issues with its complex 
recapture provision and reporting requirements. The Committee's report 
acknowledged the valuation problem in general terms: "[ v ]aluation 
difficulties and conservation purpose issues are especially problematic in 
the case of a contribution of a partial interest in property, such as 
easements, because the donor both relinquishes and retains rights and value 
relating to the underlying property.,,182 Moreover, in its discussion 
justifying repeal of personal use residential property easements, the 
Committee noted issues that would likewise apply to nonresidential 
property easements: "[s]uch personal use cases involve competing public 
right to use any part of the land as a personal residence after the contribution. The court 
pointed out that if those recommendations had been in effect with respect to the Glass' 
conservation easements, since they lived on the unencumbered part of the property, they 
would have been denied their deduction. ld. 
177 See Halperin, supra note 13, at 313 ("None of the lesser remedies are recommended 
here, however, because of the strength of the case for repeaL"). 
178 2005 JOINT COMM. F A<,:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 282. 
179 Id. The proposal required 100% recapture within two years of the contribution, and a 
ten percent reduced recapture for each year beginning in the third post contribution year. Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See supra Part lILA. 
182 2005 JOINT COMM. FA<,:ADE EASEMENT PROPOSAL, supra note 6, at 284. 
2014] Alms to the Rich: The Fac;ade Easement Deduction 265 
and private interests, as well as subjectivity regarding valuation of the 
contributed partial interest, that are not efficiently addressed in a context 
where proper valuations are expensive and the IRS lacks the expertise or 
resources to assess conservation purposes,,183 and indeed justified its 
imposition of a percentage limitation on the deduction because of valuation 
difficulties. 184 
While the report states that "weighing competing public and private 
benefits when the underlying property is the donor's residence is inherently 
more difficult than when the underlying property is to be used for 
investment or commercial purposes,,,185 it does not explain how it has 
arrived at this conciusion. 186 Increased property values are likely to apply 
to nonresidential property because of historic preservation restrictions just 
as they adhere to similarly encumbered residential properties. 
The latest proposal to amend the fayade easement deduction is two-
fold: to deny a deduction for not developing the space above historic 
buildings and to extend the PPA amendments to National Register 
properties. 18? The Joint Committee analysis begins with a statement of the 
continued valuation problems in the area of the charitable contribution of 
partial property interests. "Whether due to mistake, incompetence, 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 286 ("However, sigmficant valuation concerns justify a cap on the deductIOn 
amount for contributions of such other properties. The proposed cap of 33 percent of the 
value of the easement goes directly to valuation abuses pertaining to easements.''). 
185 Id. at 285. The report also states, without discussion or explanation. that "[i]n 
general, property held for business or investment purposes is not subject to the same 
concerns of competing public and private benefits applicable to property used as a personal 
residence." Id. at 286. 
186 The Chandler court explains the different considerations that apply to commercial 
property WIth fayade easements: 
Restrictions on construction impair the value of commercial property more 
tangIbly than they impair the value of residential property. Commercial property 
derives its value from its ability to generate cash flows. For commercial property, 
development generally correlates with increased future cash flows. More retail 
space, more space for tenants, and more room for customers generally increase 
profitability. Restrictions on the development of commercial property reduce 
potential for increased future cash flows and thus diminish value. 
Chandler v. Commissioner, No. 16534-08,2014 WL 1924147, at *7 (T.e. May 14,2014). 
187 See DEP'T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS, 162 (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 
2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS]; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., 
DESCRIPTION OF CERTAIN REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL 125 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 
2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL)' 
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misunderstanding of the law or facts, or efforts to evade taxes, valuation 
misstatements are common." 188 Those difficulties are inherently present 
because (1) there is no market for fac;:ade easements,189 and (2) the 
definition of fair market value requires a buyer and a seller with competing 
interests 190 and that tension is absent between the donor and charitable 
donee. 191 In its analysis, the Joint Committee continued to invoke the 
concerns expressed in the Service's 2004 Notice. ln As justification for the 
first proposed amendment, the Committee again described the difficulty and 
expense of contesting these easement deductions: 
The first part of the proposal provides that a taxpayer may not take 
a deduction for any reduction in value resulting from forgone 
upward development of an historic building. As noted by the 
Treasury Department, "Some taxpayers... have taken large 
deductions for contributions of easements restricting the upward 
development of historic urban buildings even though such 
development was already restricted by local authorities. Because of 
the difficulty of determining the value of the contributed easement, 
it is difficult and costly for the Internal Revenue Service to 
challenge deductions for historic preservation easements.' 193 
Because the PPA did not subject National Register properties to its 
additional requirements, the second part of the proposal on fac;:ade 
easements extends those rules to both because of the same policy concerns 
188 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 125. 
189 ld. at 126 ("[I]n general, there is no market and thus no comparable sales data for 
such easements."). 
190 See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-I(b) (1992). 
191 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 125 
("Unlike in an arm's length negotiation, in a charitable contribution situation, the interests of 
a donor and a donee organization are not adverse. A donee organization may have no 
knowledge of the amount a donor has claimed as the value of the easement and, even if 
known, has no incentive to question a donor's inflated value because there is no 
countervailing tax consequence to the donee if a donor inflates the value of contributed 
property, i.e., the donee generalIy does not pay tax on the receipt of the contribution or a 
subsequent disposition of the contributed property. Some donees may even directly or 
indirectly support an inflated value III order to secure a desired gift. Such circumstances 
cause the valuation of property in the charitable contribution context to be a particularly 
difficult determination."). 
192 ld. at 127 (noting that "[t]he proposal is a direct response to such policy concerns."); 
see I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, 2004-1 e.B. 31. 
193 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 127 
n.324 (emphasis added) (citing ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS, 
supra note 187, at 162). 
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expressed about the first part of the proposal and in order to provide 
consistency in this area of favade easement charitable donation. 194 While 
extending the application of the PPA to National Register Properties is 
another improvement, this latest amendment does not satisfactorily deal 
with the inadequacies of the PP A or the endemic issues persistent with 
favade easements. 
CONCLUSION 
In today's world, real estate is often subject to regulation that buyers 
and their neighbors accept in order to retain and increase a community's 
property values. The wealthiest of homeowners who purchase homes in 
historic districts willingly accept local restrictions on the use of their 
property. There is little reason to retain the fayade easement deduction tax 
benefit and there are many reasons to urge its repeal: the revenue loss, the 
small number of beneficiaries, the financial demographics of that group of 
beneficiaries, the continual marked overvaluation and abuse despite 
Congressional, court, and administrative review and expenses, and the 
dubious industries that are supported by the deduction, but whose practices 
contribute to inflated and improper deductions. Very few benefit from the 
large deductions, least of all the public. 
194 2013 JOINT COMM. DESCRIPTION OF 2014 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 187, at 123, 
127. 
